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The importance of the enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Act (ACJA) 2015 for the Nigerian Federation and the subsequent state 
variants have an impact on the need for speedy dispensation of justice. This 
enactment enjoins all institutional actors that make up the criminal justice 
system in Nigeria to accelerate the processes leading to the quick 
dispensation of justice for the defendant, the victim and the society. The 
Nigeria policing philosophy characterised by centralised command and 
control governance system appears to be at variance with this aim as 
provided by the Act. It is particularly so in component states where variants 
of the ACJA have not been enacted. Quick dispensation of justice may be 
painful to achieve when the police cannot be controlled by any other body in 
the Federation other than the central command. This paper provides that if 
there is no realignment or a total recalibration of the philosophies between 
the ACJA and the Nigeria Police, the aims of ACJA may become far from 
reality. The combination of jurisdictional limitation of crime and the peculiar 
federating structure of the country which imposes a pseudo-independent 
criminal justice system on each state has a crucial impact on the aims of 
ACJA. 
©2020; This is an Open Access Research distributed under the term of the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(https://Creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original works is properly cited. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Policing is society's contemporary prerogative response to deviant acts that constitute crimes. 
Therefore the efficiency and effectiveness of the policing system in the administration of 
criminal justice foretells us the status of the justice system in a community. Sloppiness by men 
and officers of the police engaged in the vital task of investigating crimes, gathering evidence for 
the prosecution against suspects and arresting criminals may spell doom for the continued 
existence of such a society. Impunity and high-handedness by men of the police on members of 
the community often end up in the erosion of fundamental human rights guaranteed under the 
laws. It is, therefore, essential to continually engage the given roles of the police within the 
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framework of the rules that establish the criminal justice system of a state, particularly in 
developing countries such as Nigeria where institutions of states are still changing to align them 
with accepted international standard. The newly enacted Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
(ACJA), 2015 falls into this category. It was signed into law by President Goodluck  Jonathan on 
May 15, 2015 and applicable to all federal courts and institutions involved in the administration 
of criminal justice.  
This paper pursues a rigorous appraisal of the re-defined patterned roles assigned to the 
police and the administrative checks and balances provided in the Administration of Criminal 
Justice Act (ACJA), 2015 and variants of this law enacted in the component states. It seeks to 
discover if there is an alignment between the Nigerian police philosophy and that of the Act. As 
of 2019, twenty-six states out of thirty-six have passed the Administration of Criminal Justice 
Law (ACJA/L) for the country.1 It also foregrounds the novel and critical inputs in the ACJA 
2015 relating to the police, which is aimed at promoting efficiency, preventing delays and 
encouraging speedy delivery of justice within the criminal justice system of Nigeria. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The Nigerian Criminal Justice System 
Criminal justice is the system of practices and institutions directed at upholding social control, 
deterring crimes or sanctioning those who violate laws with criminal penalties and rehabilitation 
efforts.2 The system encompasses the collective institutions through which an alleged criminal 
must pass through until the accusations against him have been disposed of, or the assessed 
punishment concluded.3 It is about society's formal response to crime, and it is defined more 
specifically in terms of a series of decisions taken by several agencies in response to a specific 
crime or criminal or crime in general.4 Therefore, in addition to legislation on crime, the 
institutions, infrastructure, expertise and agencies involved in the process of implementation are 
essential to a criminal justice system. 
What constitute Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria could be outlined as follows: 
the laws on crime are the Criminal Code (for the Southern part of Nigeria) and the Penal Code ( 
the Northern Part of Nigeria); The Criminal Procedure Act (for the Southern part of Nigeria) and 
The Criminal Procedure Code (the Northern Part of Nigeria) and the Administration of Criminal 
Justice Act, 2015 (for Federal Courts and Institutions administering justice); Administration of 
Criminal Justice Law of State( for States courts and institutions administering justice). The 
institutions established to engage the administration of criminal justice are The Nigerian Police, 
The  State/ Federal Ministry of Justice, Legal Aid Council, The Courts and the Nigerian Prison 
                                                          
1  "The Civil Society Observatory on Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria" August 4, 2019, accessed 8 
November 2019, https://www.cleen.org. 
2  Joseph B. Daudu, ‘Criminal Investigations, Procedure and Evidence – Reform Imperatives’ in J.B. Daudu & D. 
Adekunle (eds), Reforming Criminal Justice in Nigeria (Abuja, Nigerian Bar Association, 2012). 
3  B. Van Schaack & R. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement-Cases and Materials, 2nd ed 
(London: Thomas Reuters Press, 2010). 
4  Hazel Croall and Jane Tyrer Malcolm Davies, Criminal Justice: An Introduction to Criminal Justice System in 
Eangland and Wales (London: Pearson Education Ltd, 2005). 
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Services. Note that Borstal Homes, Free Way Houses for the convicts that have just concluded 
their terms of imprisonment are adjunct to the institutions mentioned above.5  
The objective of a criminal justice system is to deliver justice to the victims, the defendant, 
the immediate community affected by the crime committed and to the society as a whole. It also 
includes maintaining public order, sentencing criminals with regards to the principles of just 
dessert, registering social disapproval of disciplined behaviour of criminal acts, and maintaining 
public confidence. So, the general system of criminal justice is perceived as dealing with the 
threat to the public from criminals such that citizens do not feel the need to engage in private acts 
of vengeance and vigilantism.6 To achieve these objectives, there must be sufficient and 
available resources, there must be some coordination and collaboration among the agencies, and 
most importantly, there must be an existing legal framework for the coordination and 
cooperation of available resources.7 
The Nigerian Police is the first security apparatus established for the protection and securing 
of lives and property within the Nigerian territory. By Constitutional provisions the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria has only one Police Force: 
There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria which shall be styled the Nigerian Police Force and subject to the 
provision of this section, no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof. The 
members of the Nigeria Police Force shall have such powers and duties as may be conferred upon them by 
law.8 
It is empowered to investigate, detect and prosecute crime within the country.9 It has about 
three hundred and eighty-one thousand eight hundred men and officers, and its jurisdiction 
covers all the states of the Federation as there is no provision for state police.10 To carry out its 
investigative and detective duties, the Nigerian Police is divided into several departments, 
principal amongst which are the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the Special Anti-
Robbery Squad (SARS). The former investigates serious offences, apart from armed robbery, 
while the latter is for the investigation of armed robbery or related crimes. It also has the legal 
department which trains police prosecutors and appoints officers to perform their prosecutorial 
duties in the Nigerian Courts. 
In the business of public prosecution, certain personnel and institutions of government are 
apparent, and they play a significant role in the process. The Ministry of Justice at both the states 
and federal levels are at the forefront of public prosecution in Nigeria usually the personnel of 
these Ministries in the Department of Public Prosecution conduct prosecution of criminal cases. 
The Attorney General is the chief prosecutor of the state. He is conferred with powers to initiate, 
conduct, take over or discontinue any criminal prosecution in any court of law in the country 
except in the court-martial. The Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) and other counsel often 
                                                          
5  David McQuoid-Mason, “Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Service Corps Public Defenders to 
Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council,” Journal of African Law 47, no. 1 (2003): 107–10. 
6  McQuoid-Mason. 
7  A. Idigbe, ‘The Role of Legal Practitioners in an Efficient Criminal Justice System’ in Adekunle (eds), 
Reforming Criminal Justice in Nigeria. 
8  Section 214 (1) Constitution of Nigeria, 1999.  See Willie v Ibiok (2012) 52 WRN where the court elaborated on 
the establishment and powers of the Nigerian Police. 
9  Section 4 Police Act Cap P19 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004. 
10  The information on the population of the Nigerian Police could not be sourced from its website, perhaps for 
security purposes. Hence the resort to another medium. See Alice Hills, “The Dialectic of Police Reform in 
Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 2 (2008): 215–17. 
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assist the Attorney-General in his chambers. There are yet other institutions and agencies of 
government which are also empowered to conduct public prosecution. Some of these include the 
National Drug Law Enforcement   Agency   (NDLEA),   National   Agency for   Food   Drug   
Administration and   Control (NAFDAC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and 
indeed, the three arms of the Armed Forces (Army, Air force and Navy)-that conduct 
prosecution concerning offences committed by their members.11 
From the above, initial observations can be made of the roles of the Nigerian police within 
the criminal justice system. First, and importantly, the police serve as the gateway into the 
criminal justice system as they are by law given the prerogative to select persons suspected of 
criminal acts through the criminal justice system in Nigeria. It is an enormous responsibility for 
which the Nigerian police have not acquitted themselves well. It is because there are many 
documented complains by citizens of arbitrary police arrest, detention etc.12 Secondly, they 
engage in fact-finding and gathering of evidence on reported or suspected criminal activities for 
prosecution either by the police or by the office of the Attorney General. It is regulated in the 
Section 150 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 for the Attorney General of the Federation and 
section 195 of the Nigerian Constitution for the Attorney General of states.  It can also be seen in 
the case of FRN v Osahon (2006) 24 WRN 1, where the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the 
police could prosecute to the highest court of the land as long as the officer is a qualified legal 
practitioner. In reality, the usual practice is that police prosecutors file charges at the inferior 
courts. At the same time, the state counsels from the Ministry of Justice of each state prosecute 
cases at the Supreme Courts. Further analysis of the roles of the police will be made in 
subsequent paragraphs of this paper. 
 
Federalism and the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria 
Osagha defines federalism as the dispersal of power to the constituent units which is obligated by 
constitutional provisions and that this division of power between the central government and the 
component units is inevitable.13 In Ronald Watts' opinion, a characteristic feature of federalism 
generally is an emphasis upon constitutional supremacy as the ultimate source defining federal 
and state or provincial jurisdiction.14 Even at that, he concedes that federalism has not one 
uniform model applicable worldwide.15 He defines federalism in normative terms contemplating 
it as a "multi-tiered government" having "shared rule" and "regional self-rule" as featured 
elements. He elaborates further that within a federation no constituent unit is subordinate to the 
other and the powers exercised by each group has its founding in the constitution "rather than 
                                                          
11  Abegunde Babalola, “Power of Police to Prosecute Criminal Cases: Nigeria and International Perspectives,” 
European Journal of Business and Social Sciences 2, no. 11 (2014): 130. 
12 The report of Amnesty International “Annual Report 2017/2018“accessed November 11, 2019 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/&hl=en-NG ; See also the report of the 
Human Rights Watch, “Everyone’s in on the Game”; Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigerian 
Police Force 2010 accessed November 11, 2019 https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/17/everyones-
game/corruption-and-human-rights-abuses-nigeria-police-force. 
13  Eghosa E. Osagha, “A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralization,” Publius 20, no. 1 (1990): 
85. 
14  Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd ed (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008). 
15  Watts. 
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another level of government". It is nothing further that each unit is voted for directly by its 
citizens and has the power to deal directly with its citizens in the execution of legislative and 
executive powers.16 Watts identifies that the main disadvantage usually attributed to federations 
is their tendency to complexity, legalism and rigidity.17 
Daniel Elazar’s analysis of the power dynamics within the federal structure provides the 
position that federalism is not about decentralisation or centralisation of power in a constituent 
unit of government. Still, it is more about the non-centralisation of power.18 It is what Elazar 
refers to as "contractual non-centralisation" which entrenches diffusion of power that is a 
necessary part of federalism, such that power cannot be concentrated within a constituent unit 
without breaking the structure and spirit of the federal constitution.19 Beyond the structure and 
power dynamics is the need for a socio-cultural acceptance and resolution to abide by the tenets 
of federalism –otherwise referred to as “process”.20 The process is "sense of partnership, on the 
part of parties to the federal compact manifested through negotiated cooperation on issues and 
programmes and based on a commitment to openly bargain between all parties in such a way as 
to strive for consensus or failing that, an accommodation which protects the fundamental 
integrity of all the partners.”21  
The underlying precept in federalism is that the component state federating in a nation agree, 
at a certain historical interregnum, to donate some powers ordinarily exercisable by each state, to 
an external entity which the federating states have all agreed to work within unison while still 
maintaining other basic powers that qualify each state as an independent state. Such controls 
include the ability to protect the lives and property of all persons within the territory of a state, 
power exercise financial independence, the power to regulate social, economic and 
environmental activities taking place in such a state.  One phenomenon that is common to all 
federations, whether ancient or modern, is that it is the coming together of formerly independent 
entities, to establish a central organisation to serve their purposes. Whatever the size and extent 
of the central organisation, for it to remain a federal set-up, the federating units must remain 
autonomous and supreme in those areas reserved for their exercise of authority. It, therefore, 
becomes a misnomer to (or an infraction of) the agreement between the federating state 
governments and the federal government if the latter attempts to exercise primary powers of the 
component states not donated to it. The key to the formation of a federation is that historical 
point where the component states conceded powers to the federal government.22  
Nigeria purports to run a federal system of government. However, there are different 
features of the Nigerian version of federalism which conflicts with the usual operation of 
federalism in other parts of the world. For example, Canada, India, Mexico, Brazil and the 
                                                          
16  Watts. 
17  Watts. 
18  Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1991). 
19  Daniel J. Elazar, “Federalism and Consociational Regimes,” Publius 15 no. 2 (1985): 22. See generally Daniel J. 
Elazar, "Federalism vs Decentralisation: The Drift from Authenticity," Publius 6, no. 4 (1976): 12–13. 
20  Daniel J. Elazar, “International and Comparative Federalism,” PS: Political Science & Politics 26, no. 2 (1993): 
190–95. 
21  Elazar. 
22  Raoul Blindenbacher and Abigail Ostien eds., A Global Dialogue on Federalism Vol I (Montreal, McGill-
Queens University Press, 2005); K.C Wheare, Federal Government, ed. New York London, 4th edition (Oxford 
University Press, 1963).  
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United States of America all have a working model of federalism based on sharing of power 
between the Federal and State components without one overly accumulative of basic controls of 
a state. Canada's reason for adopting federalism was to forestall likely military expansionism of 
the USA and maintain separate political entity from their powerful neighbour but primarily to 
deal with the cultural division between the French and English in Canada.23 Under the Nigerian 
federal system of government, the component states do not have the constitutional power to 
create a security force for the protection of lives and property of citizens and persons living 
within the territorial boundaries of each state. The task of internal security for the whole of the 
Federation lies in the hands of federal security agencies, prominent of which is the Nigeria 
Police. It is regulated in the Section 3 of the Nigerian Police Act, Chapter P19 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 provides that there shall be established a police force to be 
known as the Nigerian Police Force and the Section 4 of the Nigerian Constitution 1999 and its 
Second Schedule Part I (Exclusive Legislative List) Item 45 where the powers to make laws for 
the police and other government security services established by law is placed firmly within the 
exclusive legislative duties of the Federal Legislature. 
The absence of a historical timeline when the peoples that makeup Nigeria discussed the 
terms of the federating union is a strategic faux pas in the creation of the country. Nigeria was 
created not by a voluntary association of previously existing closely related and freely 
contracting political units but by the imposition of the union by an imperial power on an 
artificially demarcated territory containing a heterogeneous population of strangers. Although the 
strangers had established many economic, social and political links before British rule, they did 
not recognise themselves as one political community.24 Therefore it was much easier to 
manipulate the entity that controls security through the imposition of Constitutions. It is 
compounded by the long years of military rule with the inevitable centrist, command and control 
model of leadership which negates the basic tenets of federalism.25 It has been pointed out that 
the recent increase in crime and general insecurity in the country can be traced to inadequate, ill-
trained police personnel.26 Hence there has been a concerted cry for the creation of state police, 
with a command structure limited to the state and answerable to the Governor of the state.27 
Creating state police would require a constitutional amendment for which the federal 
government has been reluctant to undertake. 
There is also the absence of a sense of partnership among the different levels of government 
that make up Nigeria.28 What exists is the conception of domination of one order of government 
(the federal) on the other rules (state and local government). Such that control of essential organs 
of state, such as policing is controlled exclusively by the federal government to the exclusion of 
                                                          
23  Rainer Knopff and Anthony Sayers, "Canada" in Raoul Blindenbacher and Abigail Ostein Eds, A Global 
Dialogue on Federalism Vol 1 (Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2005). 
24  Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria"  in Eds. 
25 Between 1960 when Nigeria gained independence from the British and 1999 when a re-established civilian rule, 
the Nigerian military was in power for 28 years out of the 39 years. 
26  Emmanuel C. Onyeozili, “Obstacles to Effective Policing in Nigeria,” African Journal of Criminology and 
Justice Studies 1, no. 1 (2005): 50. : See also Etannibi E.O. Alemika, “Policing and Perceptions of Police in 
Nigeria”  Police Stud. Int'l Rev. Police Dev. 11, (1988):170. 
27  Onyeozili, “Obstacles to Effective Policing in Nigeria”  50; Okemuyiwa Akeem Adedeji, “State Police In 
Nigeria: Issues and Challenges,” SSRN Electronic Journal 1, no. 8 (2012). 
28  Elazar, “International and Comparative Federalism.” 
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state governors who are the chief security officers of their lands. The implication is that police 
chief of each state are not amenable to whatever security policies emanating from the state 
except it is sanctioned by the Inspector General of the Police of the Federation. In November 
2016, the security details of the Governor of Rivers State was withdrawn by the state 
Commissioner of Police without consultation with the Governor. The Governor alleged political 
intimidation on the part of the federal government in order to gain the advantage for the ruling 
party at the national level on the rerun legislative election that was to take place December of 
that same year.29 Hence, policing within other orders of government has become a tool to 
dispense political favour and dominance in the hands of the federal government. 
The federalism practice in Nigeria is centrist30 in nature and its impact on the administration 
of criminal justice can be observed in the manner of control on the institutions that make up the 
criminal justice system in Nigeria. While the Nigerian Constitution envisages an independent 
criminal justice system within the component states that is distinct from the federal justice 
system, essential institutions that form the framework of the administration of criminal justice, 
such as the police and the prison services, are under the exclusive control of the federal 
government. States incapacity to control the institutions as mentioned earlier produces centres of 
laxity for the smooth running of the criminal justice system with states and invariably the whole 
country. 
In contrast, in the United States’ practice of federalism all orders of government are 
guaranteed equal status constitutionally in such a way that the existence of one order of 
government is not “the control of the US government.”31 This constitutional status provides a 
“multi-jurisdictional criminal justice system” in such a way that all orders of government have 
powers to run an independent criminal justice system with the courts ready to intervene where an 
order of government infringes on the other’s jurisdiction.32 It is therefore suggested that for the 
purpose of having a justice system that is efficacious and achieves the aim of the quick 
dispensation of justice, the police, in particular, should be brought within the control of the state 
criminal justice system. 
 
The Nigerian Police and the Understanding For Its Philosophy 
The primary functions of the police are detection and prevention of crime as well as preservation 
of law and order. The police have constitutional powers of ensuring the prevalence of law and 
order and the preservation of public peace. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria confer on the police force powers and duties for effective oversight and accountability.33 
Similarly, the Police Act charges the force with the general duties of the protection of life and 
property, detection and prevention of crime, apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and 
                                                          
29  Cletus Ukpong, "Governor Wike Accuses Police of Withdrawing Security from him," Premium Times Online 
Newspaper, November 26, 2016, accessed 11 November 2019, https://www.premiumtimeng.com/regional/south-
south-regional/216349-governor-wike-accuses-police-withdrawing-security.html&hl=en-NG.   
30  Ignatiua Akaayar Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, “Federal Republic of Nigeria” in Eds, A Global Dialogue on 
Federalism Vol 1. 
31  G. Alan Tarr, "The United States of America" in Eds. 
32  Rachel E. Barkow, “Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States,” Michigan Law 
Review 109, no. 4 (2011): 519. 
33  “The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” (n.d.). 
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order, the due enforcement of law regulations with which they are directly charged, the 
performance of such other military duties within and without Nigeria as may be required of them 
by or under the authority of any other Act.34 
The law has clothed the Nigeria Police with enviable powers in the sphere of the 
administration of justice, preservation of law, order and maintenance of public tranquillity.35 In 
the exercise of its primary powers, the police also act in other spheres which are necessarily 
incidental to the enjoyment of the actual abilities of the police. For instance, in the exercise of 
the primary duty of the police under section 4 of the Police Act, the Act gives the police the 
power of public prosecution.36 By these powers, the police can charge and prosecute any person 
suspected to have committed a crime before any court of law in Nigeria.37 
So what is the philosophy that drives this enormous power constitutionally and statutorily 
bestowed on the Nigerian Police? Identifying the Nigeria police philosophy in a coherent 
cognisable manner may not be an easy task. For a start, the Nigerian Police Force webpage does 
not contain any section where its policing philosophy is outlined. What can be sourced as 
nearing a policing philosophy can be found in what the Ministry of Interior provides as the 
"mission statement", "Values" and "Code of Conduct and Professional Standard for Police 
Officers."38  
The idea of a Nigeria policing philosophy that can be deduced from these documents refer to 
idealistic police that work to fulfil its mandate of providing security to the citizens of Nigeria 
with a well-trained force that is ready to partner "other relevant security agencies", to deliver 
quality police service that is "accessible to the generality of the people", while building in the 
members of the public "lasting trust in the police."39 The police hope to be able to achieve this 
feat by operating on a Code of Conduct and Professional Standards for Police Officers which 
provides "Nigeria Police Force with a set of guiding principles and standards of behaviour while 
on or off-duty."40 
This Code inscribes on all Nigeria Police officers the philosophy of impartiality in the 
conduct of their official duties as an official representative of the government. It imposes the 
principle of circumspection in the use of force and negatives the attitude of "unnecessary 
infliction of pain or suffering and will never engage in cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment of 
any person."41 The summary of the eight principles set for the conduct of officers conceptualises 
that ideal officer that is law-abiding and carries out his duty with integrity and impartiality, 
behaves in a manner that does not bring dishonour to the force, treat members of the public with 
respect and courtesy, and manages the information they have professionally and confidentially to 
ensure the safety and security of everyone in the country.42 
                                                          
34  Section 4 of the Police Act Cap 359 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN), 2004. 
35  Benjamin Okereke Brownson, “The Role of Nigeria Police Force in the Administration of Justice: Issues and 
Challenges” (Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 2012). 
36  Sections 23 Police Act, Chapter 359, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
37  See  FRN v. Osahon (Supra) 
38  “Nigeria Police Force,” Ministry of Interior, 2017. 
39  “Nigeria Police Force.” 
40  “Nigeria Police Force.”: See also the Nigerian Police Code of Conduct. 2014, accessed June 28, 2018, 
http://eie.ng/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/NIGERIAPOLICECODEOFCONDUCT.pdf  
41  “Nigeria Police Force.” 
42  “Nigeria Police Force.” 
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Despite the lofty visions the Nigeria Police may have for itself, the average Nigerian citizen 
has for a long time held the police in distrust as a consequence of their belief that the police are 
unamenable to living up to the lofty propagates of the Code of conduct, police regulation and 
law.43 At any rate, when compared to citizen's expectations police performance has been 
abysmal.44 The Nigerian police have been noted to be violent in their approach to other citizens 
and maintain an attitude of impunity which has a theme of “you are guilty until you prove 
yourself innocent.” A recent survey has shown the Nigeria police as highhanded, corrupt and a 
reliable tool to political actors.45 This survey put to tatters any of the lofty ideals the Nigerian 
police may wish to put out as its philosophy. 
Joseph A. Schafer et al., in analysing the deductibility of a policing philosophy from the 
mission statement of Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) in the United States, 
comment that the mission statement serves as an ideal template for a targeted future yet to be 
achieved and a strategic pointer to the direction such a police outfit intend to pursue. 
“The mission statement defines the organisational purpose: what the organisation does, for whom, how, and 
why. Mission statements can help assess new services or programs by asking, "Does this fit within our 
mission?" The values statement includes core values that, ideally, are universally subscribed to by all 
organisational members. These are the guiding principles, the core ideology or philosophy.”46 
They illustrate by citing some of the mission statements of the CSPD which provides that 
"We believe that we (the Police) derive our powers from the people we serve; we will never 
tolerate the abuse of our police powers; we recognise that our conduct, both on and off duty, is 
inseparable from the professional reputation of the Police Department; we are committed to 
protecting the constitutional rights of all individuals; we view the people of our community as 
our customers who deserve our concern, care, and attention; we encourage the pursuit of higher 
education by our employees.”47 Obviously, the pursuit of providing security to the satisfaction of 
their "customer" in line with the constitutional provision with a competent well-trained staff can 
be deduced as the philosophy of this police department. 
Given the detectable citizen-friendly philosophy of a police department in the United States, 
as shown above, David Weisburd et al. observe that realising these philosophies in the daily 
activities of police departments across the country "mirrors the conflict between order and 
legality” such that the question is not “whether police operate under the constraints of due 
process of law, but whether they operate within bounds of civilised conduct.”48 It is because the 
police, as part of the democratic bureaucracy emphasises initiative rather than "disciplined 
adherence to rules and regulations" in the achievement of order. However, citizen's rights and the 
constraints it imposes on law enforcement officials is what the rule of law emphasises. The 
                                                          
43  Marshall Carter and Otwin Marenin, “Police Culture in Nigeria: A Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Asian 
and African Studies 15, no. 3–4 (1980): 242–47. 
44  Adoyi Onoja, “A Reappraisal of the Historiography of the Police in Nigeria during the Colonial Period,” Journal 
of Historical Society of Nigeria 22 (2013): 1. 
45  Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) Report, “Police most Corrupt Institution in 
Nigeria, Reveals SERAP Survey “ ,2019 , accessed November 15, 2019  https://serap-nigeria.org/police-most-
corrupt-institution-in-nigeria-reveals-serap-survey-ngo/  
46  Joseph A. Schafer et al., The Future of Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Managers and Leaders (Boca 
Raton: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, 2012). 
47  Joseph A. Schafer. 
48  Craig Uchida and Lorraine Green eds David Weisburd, Police Innovation and Control of the Police: Problems of 
Law, Order, and Community (New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc, 1993). 
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problem faced by the police in a democratic society is, therefore, managing the tension caused by 
the constraints instituted by "legality" on the one hand and the operational consequence of 
imposing "order, efficiency and initiative" on the other.49 
Despite the scant details of the Nigeria police philosophy, there is a more significant 
political challenge for the achievement of this philosophy. The foundation of police governance 
is a command and control precept, and this hierarchy of control is designed to be distant to the 
influence of the public.50 However, in a democratic setting, this hierarchy of control is not 
shielded from the publicly appointed head of government. In Africa, as Alice Hills observes, the 
police answers to the President only such that reference to democratic control of public 
institutions such as the police is "rarely more than tactical concessions or gestures to donors on 
the part of political elites.”51 So in the end, police philosophy is what the President chooses it to 
be as "policing is shaped by the politics of political order and accumulation in ways that are at 
variance with requirements of accountability.”52  Presidential attitudes to police may not be 
measured in precision as it appears that these political heads see the police “little more than 
technicians capable of dealing with crime.”53 
One apparent lacuna in the Nigeria police philosophy is the policy of professional autonomy 
which erodes the influence of politics, the political elite and the ruling class. There is a need for 
the police to establish this professional autonomy based on "strategic partnership with the 
public" in the fight against crime rather than being content to be adjuncts to groups controlling 
the state resources.54 Police partnership with the public will create a power base for them which 
will support them in their inevitable fight against political actors that see them as tools to be used 
to achieve political ends. In the end, the public in a democratic setting, being the employer of 
both the police and the politician, will realise it stands to gain more lending support to the 
independence of the police while understanding thatn “police governance should be guided by 
broad normative principles such as accountability, civilian oversight, public participation and, 
increasingly, development and poverty reduction.”55 
Getting the support of a sceptical and wary Nigerian public based on the scantiness of the 
publicised police philosophy, which is dissonance with the Act of its personnel is not going to be 
an easy feat.56 There is an increasing perception that the quality of personnel making up a 
security agency like the police impacts positively or otherwise on its philosophy.57 Recruitment 
of high-quality police personnel allows for the better manoeuvrability and capacity to tow the 
fine line between the imposition of order and working within the bounds of legality.58 
                                                          
49  David Weisburd. 
50  Mathew Jones, “A Complexity Science View of Modern Police Administration,” Public Administration 
Quarterly 32, no. 3 (2008): 447. 
51  Alice Hills, “Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 403. 
52  Hills. 
53  Hills. 
54  Hills. 
55  Eboe Hutchful and J. Kayode Fayemi, Security System Reform in Africa (Security System Reform and 
Governance, 2005). 
56  Onoja, “A Reappraisal of the Historiography of the Police in Nigeria during the Colonial Period.” 
57  David Weisburd, Police Innovation and Control of the Police: Problems of Law, Order, and Community. 
58  David Weisburd. 
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The Nigerian Police in the Administration of Criminal Justice: Wither the Synergy? 
The Nigeria Police is a vital and active participant in the administration of criminal justice in 
Nigeria. A society's attempt to control the incidents of crime, investigate the commission of a 
crime, punish crime, deter crime may amount to nought without the existence of a competent 
policing system. Conversely, an inefficient policing system that is ill-equipped, ill-trained and 
unmotivated to the pursuit of excellence in their job spells doom for such society, and there 
might be a return to what Thomas Hobbes argues that the 'state of Nature' every person has a 
natural right or liberty to do anything one thinks necessary for preserving one's own life and life 
is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’59 Therefore the Nigeria Police’s role in the 
administration of criminal justice can be stated as follows: Receiving distress calls from 
complainants who are victims of crimes,60 investigate crime,61 arrest suspects,62 grant bail before 
trial63 remittance of the criminal case file to the Ministry of Justice for Legal Advice,64 prosecute 
criminals in courts,65 serving as witnesses in cases in the courts.66 
                                                          
59  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Basil Blackwell, 1946). 
60  The first point of complaint about many Nigerian that are victims of crime is the police. Although there is no 
central phone number to call the police during the process of distress (Such as the 911 in the USA) victims still 
find a way to reach the police during or immediately after a crime has been committed. See The Nigerian Police 
Regulation 1968 at Regulation 250 (d) (i) which forbids a Police station to keep a record of all complaints made 
of the commission of criminal offences. 
61  By the function of section 4 of the Police Act, one of the cardinal duties of the police is to investigate the crime. 
The capacity of the police to investigate crime and detect criminals for prosecution has deterrence value. It is 
also aimed at securing lives at the property of citizen and persons in Nigeria. Adjunct to this is the power 
conferred on the police officer to intervene to prevent the commission of a crime. See sections 50 & 51 of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015. 
62  The police officer is empowered by the law to arrest any person he finds committing any crime or any person 
whom he reasonably suspects of having committed or of being about to commit any crime in Nigeria. The direct 
implication is that anybody arrested by the police may have his freedom curtailed and may not be heard 
complaining that his right to freedom of movement has been violated as long as the detention is within the 
constitutionally prescribed limit or such extended detention is authorised by a competent court of law in Nigeria. 
A common practice by the Nigerian Police is to arrest in lieu. This is a form of practice where the relative of a 
suspect (wife, mother, father, husband etc.) is arrested and kept in custody till the time the suspected criminal is 
produced by other members of the suspect's extended family or suspects gives himself up to the police. 
Furthermore, arresting a suspect by the police merely based on a civil wrong or breach of contract has also been 
prohibited by the law. Section 24 Police Act.; See also sections 7,8 & 52 0f the ACJA 2015. 
63 The Police are empowered to grant bail before trial to suspects for minor offences upon entering recognisance by 
the suspect with or without sureties for a reasonable amount.  Section 24 (1)(c) (ii) of the Police Act. See also 
Section 31 of the ACJA 2015. 
64  When the police investigation is completed, and the Investigating Police Officer (IPO) believes that the offence 
committed by the suspect is a capital offence or any other serious crime, the Duplicate Casefile is often 
forwarded to the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in the Ministry of Justice of the State where the crime 
is committed for Legal Advice. The Attorney-General of the State shall issue a Legal Advice within a reasonable 
time stating whether upon the evidence provided by the police investigation, there is a prima facie case 
established against the suspect or not. The ACJA at section 376(2) mandates the Attorney-General of the 
Federation to issue Legal Advice within 14 days of receipt of casefile from the police. 
65  The Police are empowered to prosecute criminals in all the courts in Nigeria. See Section 23 of the Police Act.  
This duty is carried out through the legal department of the Nigerian Police. In practice, most offences at the 
inferior courts (such as the Magistrate Courts) are prosecuted by police officers trained and skilled to prosecute 
at the inferior court. The police also have officers who are lawyers and who could prosecute in the Superior 
Courts of Record. For example, the Special Fraud Unit (SFU) of the Nigerian Police prosecute fraud-related 
cases at the Federal High  Courts with officers who are qualified lawyers. See also Osahon v FRN (supra) 
66  The IPOs often serve as witnesses in a criminal trial conducted in the Courts. Being custodians of the evidence 
gathered during the investigation, most of the exhibits prosecution counsel intends to rely upon, and tender in 
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The enactment of the ACJA 2015 and its variants at the state level is about legal control of 
the police. Judicial powers are defined as including any written rules regulating police conduct, 
and this contains statutes, court decisions, and administrative policies.67 The peculiar pattern of 
federalism that Nigeria runs, which ensure that centralisation of powers in the federal 
government prevents the exercise of legal control on federal agencies such as the Nigeria police 
by any other order of government.68 Even at the intra-agency relations, between the federal 
ministry of justice and the police on matters relating to the administration of criminal justice, 
there is likely to be a dispersal of power position when it comes to the supremacy of order in the 
sphere of operation of each agency within the criminal justice system. The command and control 
nature of the police assures it remains unamenable to the dictates of the ACJA 2015 since the 
final order the police respond to comes from the Inspector-general- who also panders to the 
political whims of his master, the President of the country. 
The political centralisation of key security agencies such as the police in the federal order of 
government as practised in Nigeria with component states having no control of the security 
architecture of their countries serves as a point of dissonance to the achievement of speedy trials 
as wont to be established by the ACJA 2015 and all other state variants of it.69 It is the fact that 
the police supreme control does not lie in the law but in the political needs and interpretation of 
Nigerian President who is Commander-in-chief of all the Nigerian forces. His understanding of a 
security situation, perhaps as advised by the Inspector General of Police, is to all intent and 
purposes, the law and nothing more pretentious. Until this centralised lopsided federalist model 
is amended, it is opined that there will continue to be friction between the aspirations of the 
ACJA and its states variants and the role of the Nigeria police inscribed in these laws. 
 
The Assessment of the Police Role in the Nigerian Criminal Justice System 
There is need for an assessment of the role of the Nigeria Police considering the purpose of the 
ACJA 2015 which is to promote efficient management of the criminal justice institutions, speedy 
dispensation of justice, protection the society from crime and interests of the suspects, the 
defendant and the victim.70 This is so as the ACJA 2015 demands that all law enforcement 
agencies (often Federal agencies) or persons involved in criminal justice administration comply 
with the provisions of the Act. It would mean that even when the ACJA apply at the federal 
courts and federal institutions involved in the administration of criminal justice, the police are 
still bound to act in fulfilment of the tenets of this law in states where the CPA or CPC still 
operates to ensure speedy dispensation of justice. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
court in proof of the elements of the offence is done through the IPO. Evidence such as the extra-judicial 
confessional statement of the defendant, weapons used for commission of the crime, pictures of crime scene etc. 
would have to be tendered by the IPO(s) who investigated the crime. 
67  Samuel Walker, “Historical Roots of the Legal Control of Police Behavior,” in David Weisburd Craig Uchida 
and Lorraine Green Eds, Police Innovation and Control of the Police: Problems of Law, Order, and Community 
(New York: Springer-Verlag New York Inc, 1993). 
68  Ignatius Akaayar Ayua and Dakas C.J. Dakas, “The Federal Republic of Nigeria,” in John Kincaid and G. Alan 
Tarr Eds, A   Global Dialogue on Federalism: Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Coun-
tries  Vol I (Mc-Gill-Queen’s University Press 2005) 239. 
69   Section 214(1) Nigerian Constitution 1999. 
70  Section 1(1) ACJA 2015. 
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Achievement of speedy dispensation of justice demands that every agency, or persons 
involved in the administration of criminal justice, take decisions quickly and without delay. It is 
doubtful if the police would be able to meet this demand of the ACJA 2015 due to the over-
centralisation of the decision-making command system, thereby reducing the rate of reaction to 
events and impugn flexibility. For example, Section 5 of the Police Act, following the provisions 
of section 215 (2), of the Nigeria Constitution, provides for the office and rank of a 
Commissioner of Police. They shall be in control of contingents of the Police Force stationed in 
a State. He is subject, however, to the command of the Inspector-General of Police or whosoever 
acts for him, in his absence. Therefore, there is less room for the use of initiative by any other 
officer lower than the Inspector General of the Police. 
Police are wont of arresting suspects and detaining them before completion of the 
investigation. Where detention spans beyond the constitutionally provided period, there is the 
tact of applying to the court for a remand proceeding (often referred to as Holding Charge) to 
keep the suspect in jail for as long as the police.71 It creates the "awaiting trial" phenomenon that 
has choked up the prison space in Nigeria.72 The ACJA 2015 attempts to correct this by 
providing that Magistrates and High Court Judges shall conduct an inspection of the police 
station or other places of detention other than prisons within his territorial jurisdiction where he 
may inspect the record of detention, direct arraignment for detainees and grant bail where bail 
has been refused by the police.73 This procedure is to be conducted at least once every month by 
the judicial officers concerned. In case a police officer in charge of a police station fails to 
comply with the dictates of this law, this fault shall be treated as misconduct and shall be dealt 
under the relevant Police Regulation and the Police Act.74 It appears that having police carry out 
actions that run counter to the popular conception of justice or even against legal precepts as 
contained in the prevailing laws that support the criminal justice system is not peculiar to a 
developing African country like Nigeria. Examples of such deviant police acts have been 
identified in Indonesia too.75 
 The Indonesian judiciary has not helped curtail deviant police characterisation as the courts 
have long been perceived as having "a reputation for corruption, institutional decay and low 
levels of competence.”76 The bright side to the Indonesia example is that there appears to be in 
recent times a deliberate a technical improvement in the police force which has allowed the 
power to respond proactively to the current existential threat to national security.77 This judicial 
                                                          
71  Mrs E.A. Lufadeju V. Evangelist Bayo Johnson  (2007) 8 NWLR (PT 1037) 535.  
72  The International Centre for Investigative Reporting, "Over 80% of Prison Inmates are Awaiting Trial, "2016, 
accessed March 11, 2018, http://icirnigeria.org/80-prison-inmates-awaiting-trial/;  Emeka Obioha, “Challenges 
and Reforms in the Nigerian Prisons System,” J Soc Sci 27 no.2 (2011):95,98; See also the Home Office's 
Country Policy and Information Note, "Nigeria: Prison Conditions, "2016, accessed March 11, 2018, 
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1478790062_cpin-nigeria-pcs-v1-0-nov2016.pdf. 
73  Section 34(1) ACJA,2015. 
74  Section 34(5) ACJA, 2015. 
75  Bambang Waluyo, “Law Enforcement in Indonesia (Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia),” Sinar Grafika, Jakarta, 
2016, 2 cited in Budiyanto, “Implementation of Suspect and Accused Rights in the Indonesian Criminal Justice 
System,” JL Pol'y & Globalisation 77 (2018): 85. 
76  Cate Sumner and Tim Lindsey, “Courting Reform: Indonesia’s Islamic Courts and Justice For The Poor,” 
International Journal For Court Administration 4, no. 1 (2011): 6. 
77  Muhammad Tito Karnavian, “The Role of the National Police in Countering Insurgencies in Indonesia,” Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses 9, no. 9 (2017): 8–13. 
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monitoring of the police is the sequel to the provision of the ACJA 2015, which mandates the 
officer in charge of a Police Station or any official which includes the Directorate of State 
Services (DSS), The Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLA), Nigerian Security and 
Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) in charge of an agency authorised to make an arrest, to give a 
monthly report to the nearest Magistrate of cases of all suspects arrested without a warrant within 
the limit of their jurisdiction. This is a form of checks and balances between the organs of 
government in a democracy like Nigeria and the enthronement of the rule of law. Rule of Law is 
a regime of the rule announced in advance which predictably and effectively applied to all they 
address including the ruler who promulgate them -formal rules that tell people how the state will 
deploy coercive force and enable them to plan their affair accordingly. For the rule of law to 
succeed, it depends not only on the provision of adequate safeguards against abuse of power by 
the executive but also on the existence of effective government capable of maintaining law and 
order, of ensuring sufficient social and economic conditions of life for the society. For an act to 
rule, it has to be made. This is the primary function of the legislative arm of government which is 
to make laws through a clearly defined legislative process aimed at producing statutes that would 
be applied equally to all persons within the territory of the state where the law is promulgated. It 
should be noted that there is no free-standing clause explicitly enumerated in the constitution on 
the rule of law but what is espoused is the principle of democracy.78 The ACJA 2015, being an 
enactment by the Federal Legislature, seeks to check some excessive conducts of the police 
which is an agency under the Executive Arm of Government. The Act then imposes the Act of 
checking these excesses on judicial officers who derive their powers from the Judicial Organ of 
Government.79 A dissonance is created for this judicial monitoring of the police in the Nigerian 
states that are yet to enact the administration of criminal justice law.80 
The capacity of a crime controlling agency to detect crime through investigation and 
deployment of tools designed to unravel crimes reflects the effectiveness of such agency in 
achieving its aims and consequently in large part, deterring criminal intents from manifesting 
and criminal acts from going unpunished. Where capacity decay impugns the workings of such 
an agency, its officials might then have to resort to methodologies that can be easily (improperly) 
procured to justify their existence as a crime-fighting outfit. It is the case in the manner in which 
the Nigeria Police acquire extra-judicial confessional statements from suspects- which when 
accepted in evidence by court is capable alone in securing the guilty verdict against the 
defendant. 
                                                          
78  Olusola Babatunde Adegbite, Oreoluwa Omotayo Oduniyi, and Jubril Akinwunmi Farinde, “Separation of 
Powers Under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution: The Core Legal Dilemmas,” Sriwijaya Law Review 3, no. 2 
(2019): 235–52, https://doi.org/10.28946/slrev.Vol3.Iss2.281.pp235-252. 
79  Sections 4, 5, 6 and 14 of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999; Jeremy Waldron, "Separation of Powers in Thought 
and Practice?" Boston College Law Review 54 (2013): 432; Bo Li, "Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law." 
Perspective 2no.1(2012) accessed March 13, 2018 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=159103014120223&story_fbid=455757904454731; Toriola 
Oyewo, Constitutional Law and Procedure in Nigeria (Ibadan: John Archers Ltd, 2009). Adedoyin Akinsulore, 
“Democracy, Good Governance, Rule of Law and the  Executive   in Nigeria,” Ife Juris Review 2 (2015):389-
411. 
80  As at 2019, of the 36 states in Nigeria, there still ten states that have yet to enact a variant of the ACJL.  The 
states are Borno, Gombe,Taraba (North East) Sokoto, Katsina, Zamfara, Kebbi (North West) Niger (North 
Central) Ebonyi, Imo (East). See Civil Society Observatory on the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria 
(2019). 
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The Nigerian Evidence Act espouses the principles of “best evidence rule”81 such that to 
succeed in proving a statement of fact, convincing evidence “that proves beyond a reasonable 
doubt” must be put forward in a criminal trial.82 The elevation of “confessional statement” to the 
level of best evidence has encouraged the Nigeria Police to rely on this form of evidence to 
prove criminal charges against defendants in courts. Judicial pronouncements have supported 
this form of proof by stating that "confessional statements" solely is sufficient to prove guilt in 
any charge of an offence.83 
One of the innovative provisions in the ACJA 2015 is plea bargaining in section 270 of the 
Act. Plea bargaining in Nigeria can be traced to the trial of Tafa Balogun in 2005.84 The ACJA 
defines “plea bargain” to mean the process in criminal proceedings whereby the defendant and 
the prosecution work out a mutually acceptable disposition of the case, including the plea of the 
defendant to a lesser offence than that charged in the complaint or information and in conformity 
with other conditions imposed by the prosecution, in return for a lighter sentence than that for the 
higher charge, subject to the court’s approval.85 
By section 270 (7) of the ACJA, a plea bargain agreement shall be reduced into writing. It 
shall affirm that, before the approval, the defendant has been informed that he has a right to 
remain silent and that he is not obliged to make any confession or admission that could be used 
in evidence against him. The agreement shall fully state the terms of the contract and any 
disclosure made and shall be signed by the prosecutor, the defendant, the legal practitioner and 
the interpreter if any. 
One obvious inference from the meaning of the concept of plea bargaining concerning the 
underlying philosophy of Nigeria’s criminal jurisprudence is that once an accused person 
accedes to the use of plea bargaining, his right to presumption of innocence and the 
corresponding duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt abates. A guilty 
plea would be entered, and a pre-negotiated penalty follows. Again, any person convicted in this 
circumstance cannot appeal, unless fraud can be proved or there is a fundamental breach of his 
rights, just like a consent judgment in a civil case.86 
Apparently, plea bargaining hastens the process of criminal prosecution. Whether the 
Nigerian police will see plea bargaining as a means to achieving quick resolution of criminal 
matters is still in doubt as they have not been known to exercise this option provided under the 
law.87 Other specialised criminal investigation agencies, such as Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) Nigerian Drug Law 
                                                          
81   Sections 131,132 & 135 of Nigerian Evidence Act, 2011. 
82   Dale Nance, “The Best Evidence Principle,” Iowa Law Review 73(1987-1988) 227. 
83  Section 29 of the Nigerian  Evidence Act,2011; See also the cases of Egboghonome v. State (1993)7 NWLR (Pt 
306) 383 SC, Alarape v. State [2001] FWLR (Pt. 41) 1872 SC; See also Adedoyin Akinsulore, “A 
Jurisprudential Analysis of Confessional Statement,” Ife Juris Review 3 (2015): 982–1000. 
84 Samuel Idhiarhi, “Practice and Procedure of Plea Bargain under ACJ Act,” Punch Newspaper, 2017. See also the 
high profile case of Tafa Balogun, former Inspector General of the Nigerian Police in the corruption case of  
Tafa Balogun vs the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2005) 4 NWLR(Pt 324) 190 where the defendant in a plea 
bargain deal forfeited the sum of  $ 130 million to the state for a lesser punishment of six months imprisonment.  
85   Section 494 (1) ACJA 2015. 
86  Kehinde Adegbite, “Plea Bargaining In Nigeria: Any Legal Foundation?,” The Lawyer’s Chronicle, 2019. 
87  Chinwe Mordi, “The Use of Plea Bargain in Nigerian Criminal Law,” Beijing Law Review 9, no. 2 (2018): 153–
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Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)88 have been known to use the plea bargaining option with many 
criminal cases expeditiously dealt with.  Even at that, it is argued that there is need for legislative 
intervention stipulating clearly defined guidelines for the application of plea bargaining,  as plea 
bargaining cannot be entrusted to the whims and caprices of law-enforcement agencies and the 
courts as it is presently constituted. The effect of lack of such guidelines, for instance, played out in 
the infamous case of pension fraud where one John Yusuf, an Assistant Director with the Police Pension 
Board allegedly misappropriated about N32.8 billion and upon his making a guilty plea, he was given a 
sentence of two years' imprisonment or an option of paying N750, 000 as fine. He gladly and instantly 
paid the meagre fine. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is often said that justice delayed is justice denied. Hence the central philosophy of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act of 2015, and its variants in the states,  make it a 
prominent cause to expedite criminal trials. This paper has examined this philosophy and its 
conceptual acceptability with a key institution within the administration of criminal justice in 
Nigeria- the Nigerian police- and finds that there is a centrifugal variance in the practical 
understanding of the law on the expeditious dispensation of criminal matter within the 
administration of criminal justice by the police and the provisions of the law. The skewed federal 
system run by Nigeria, where the federating state cannot run a fully independent criminal justice 
system, will continue to deflate proactive legal aspirations that may be designed for the smooth 
running of the criminal justice system in Nigeria. This paper concludes that the Nigeria police, as 
it is presently established within the Nigerian Constitution will continue to pose as an impedi-
ment to the development of the criminal justice system and its aspiration to dispense justice 
quickly. There is a need for change. 
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